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Three Levels of Argument
In assessing the Brandt Report, it is useful to distinguish
three aspects or levels of argument within it. At the
most specific level, the Report contains a set of
recommendations for action, a programme'. This
suggested programme of action is related to the second
level of argument, which may be termed the framework
for action. Unlike the actual recommendations, this
does not appear in the Report as a set of explicit
propositions, but is rather to be inferred and pieced
together from various statements within it. I use the
phrase to describe the general tone or character of the
various proposals which the Commission has made,
which in turn is associated with a particular view of
economic and political processes and choices. Finally,
both specific recommendations and the framework in
which they are placed are linked to the Commission's
vision of the international political and economic
system, and of the current predicament of mankind.
Now although these three aspects or levels of argument
are closely inter-connected in the thinking of the
Commission, as also in the text of the Report, it is
convenient to consider them separately. The argument
that follows has a distinctly but unavoidably negative
cast, since it is with reference to these broader and
more general aspects that the Report seems to me
most open to criticism, and indeed to a whole range of
damaging objections.
Such a view of the Brandt Report is clearly at variance
with the general public reaction to it. In Britain, at any
rate, the reaction has been very largely enthusiastic,
while it is precisely the broader aspects of the Report,
its diagnosis and general approach, which have been
most warmly acclaimed. A good specimen of this
attitude of mind is to be found in the leading article on
the Report which appeared, just after its publication,
in The Times of London. Here it was suggested that:
as a description of the problems that face us, anda
warning of what would happen if wefailto respond,
the report can hardly be faulted. It ought to become
one of the basic documents of the decade.2
*First published in The World Economy. vol 3 no 1. June 1980. to
whom thanks are due for permission to reprint this article.
Of the first 16 chapters, 12 conclude with a concise statement of
recommendations: the final 17th chapter is headed 'A Programme of
Priorities', and sketches out under eight headings a set of 'tasks for the
80s and 90s'. together with a shorter-term 'emergency programme' for
the period 1980-85: while Annexe I of the Report draws all this
material together into a self-contained 'summary of recommend-
ations'.
Z The Times, London, 13 February 1980.
Bulletin, 1981. vol 12 no 2. Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
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The main single contention of this review is that such
judgements are seriously, even absurdly, in error. The
Brandt Report is very far from providing an authoritative
treatment of the current situation and problems of
international society. On the contrary, the perception
of events and relationships that is embodied in it is at
best open to question, and at worst so distorted that
the argument of the Report becomes unreal to the
point of fantasy.
THE VISION
In the very first sentence of its Report, the Brandt
Commission states that the crisis through which
international relations and the world economy are
now passing presents great dangers, and they appear
to be growing more serious [page 30j. At later stages in
the Report, it is suggested that the 1980s could witness
even greater catastrophes than the 1930s [page 471
and that at the beginning of the 1980s the world
community faces much greater dangers than at any
time since the Second World War L page 267 j.
Predicament of Manldnd
The principal dangers to humanity, which between
them are thought to present a threat to human survival,
arise in three ways, which the Commission perceives
as connected: j) from war, and from various forms of
conflict and violence associated with international
rivalries and tensions; ii) from a threat to the biological
environment; and iii) from that malfunctioning of the
world economy, which has now become so serious
that some form of breakdown is possible. All these are
familiar and well-recognised subjects, on which a vast
amount has been said and written, and which some
people might consider to be only loosely and incidentally
connected with the issues of poverty and economic
development which were the Brandt Commission's
particular concern. The main distinctive feature of
the Commission's vision consists of a strongly-held
belief that this connection is not incidental but extremely
close and intimate. After its initial reference, just
quoted, to the crisis in international relations and the
world economy, the Report goes on to say:
We believe that the gap which separates rich and
poor countriesa gap so wide that at the extremes
people seem to live in different worldshas not
been sufficiently recognised as a major factor in this
crisis [page 30[.
Shortly afterwards, in the same opening chapter, it is
argued that the world, like individual societies,
can become stronger by becoming a just and humane
society. If it fails in this, it will move towards its own
destruction ]page 33].
What is the nature of the supposed connection between
these two sets of issues, and what are the changes
within the international system which can be clearly
seen to be desirable when this connection is recognised?
The Commission's perception of the relationships
involved can be summarised in the following three
propositions:
each of the three sources of danger listed
abovenamely war, environmental damage, and
economic malfunctioningis associated with, and
made more acute by, the existence of poverty in the
developing countries and of inequality between the
rich countries and the poor ones. Hence they should
be conceived as a single related set of problems,
which can best be dealt with through a concerted
set of measures directed towards these underlying
causal factors;
the key to raising the living standards of the
poorest people in the world, and to reducing the
extent of inequality among independent states, is to
be found in a fundamental reform of the international
economic system, which at present operates in such
a way as to frustrate and impede the process of
development in poor countries;
in economic affairs especially, there is a much
greater degree of mutual interest between rich and
poor countries than is generally realised. Fundamental
reforms in the present international system hold out
the possibility of substantial gains to both sides in
the North-South dialogue, through greater shared
prosperity as well as a higher measure of security.
Each of these three propositions will be considered in
turn. In connection with the first, separate attention
will be given to each of the three identified sources of
danger to the human race.
War, Poverty, and Economic Inequality
between States
Chapter 7 of the Brandt Report is concerned with
disarmament and development, but very little is said
in it about the alleged connection between poverty,
inequality and the threat of war. At one point it is
stated that much of the insecurity in the world is
connected with the divisions between rich and poor
countriesgrave injustice and mass starvation causing
additional instability ]page 124]. No argument or
evidence, however, is provided for this assertion, nor
for the view put forward by Willy Brandt in his
introduction that North-South relations should be
seen for what they are, a historic dimension for the
active pursuit of peace ]page 15]. In fact, the notion
that international security is mainly or even significantly
threatened by the division between rich and poor
countries is hard to reconcile with some obvious facts
to which the Brandt Report makes no reference.
As a general point, one may note that war has been a
continuing and endemic state of affairs throughout
human history, so that any serious attempt to understand
it must take account of this fact. Indeed, as the
Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey, has remarked,
in an interestîng recent study, to endeavour to establish
a theory of war as such may be too one-sided and
restrictive an approach, since the condition of peace is
no less in need of explanation than that of war3.
Nevertheless, while war has always been with us, the
condition of extreme inequality between rich states
and poor states has arisen only quite recently in
history; and it is only in the past thirty years or so that
is has been perceived as an issue of international
concern. Hence the general proposition that such
inequalities have in the past been a leading cause of
instability and conflict cannot be seriously
maintained.
lt could instead be argued that international inequality
is a recent but important additional cause of tension
between states, which has in fact operated over the
past thirty years. and which moreover is likely to
become increasingly significant in the future. This in
fact appears to be the Brandt Commission's view.
Neither strand ofthis hypothesis, however, is supported
by the evidence. As to what has actually happened in
the period since World War Il. it is sufficient to
consider the main types and instances of international
conflict that have arisen within it. Such a list might
include the two major multi-nation wars, in Korea and
Vietnam: the recurrent though brief outbreaks of war
between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states, and
between India and Pakistan; the various civil wars and
disturbances which have impinged on the international
scene, as for example in Greece. Nigeria. the Lebanon
and Angola: some chronic territorial and jurisdictional
disputes. such as those between Greece and Turkey
over Cyprus and the Aegean. Argentina and Chile. or
Ethiopia and Somalia; and as topical cases, the violence
which is currently to be found in Afghanistan. Eritrea,
Kampuchea. and the Western Sahara. All of these
disputes can be explained with reference to national,
ideological or other divisive factors of a kind long
familiar in history. while in some cases they have also
been connected with the broader chronic division
between East and West, between the member countries
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and the members of the Warsaw Pact. While in some
Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War, 2nd ed. Melbourne. Sun
Books. 1977.
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of these cases economic factors were no doubt involved,
it is difficult to trace in any one of them the smallest
sign that considerations either of mass poverty or of
international economic inequality have played an
initiating or aggravating part.
As to the future, one would expect that poverty would
become less rather than more important as a potential
cause of hostility and tension, for the simple reason
that the proportion of the world's population which is
living in absolute poverty has been declining over the
past three decades, and can reasonably be expected to
decline still further. lt is conceivable that economic
inequality between states, as distinct from poverty
within them, might become increasingly a source of
friction; but to suggest that it is likely to become
dominant, when in the past it has been a negligible
factor and when the main perennial causes of
international tension are still very much in evidence.
seems to me an unconvincing line of speculation.
One final element remains in the Commission's argument
that the risk of war is increasing for reasons connected
with the international economic system and the relations
between the rich countries and the developing world.
The Report asserts that
North-South relations are... crucial, not least orer
eneit' and mineral supplies, which could be the
cause i')f conflict if Flot brought within a
framework of international agreement I page 751.
Although this is a possible argument. it is a good deal
less cogent than the Report implies, for two reasons.
First, disputes over energi' and mineral supplies have
not in the past been one of the main causes of
international conflict, while in recent episodes of
violence, including those listed above, they have been
a factor of zero or negligible importance. Secondly.
any future disagreements over such issues would not
necessarily take place between North and South.
since some of the main producers and exporters of
minerals are Northern countries, while some of the
countries which are heavily dependent on imports of
such materials are in the South.
From all this it appears that the Commission's confident
but unsupported assertion, that peace and security are
closely and increasingly linked to poverty and
international economic differences, is largely without
foundation.
Environment
At one point in the Report, a reference is inade to the
mounting destruction of the earth : capacitl' lo support
1ie page 79j. Again, no evidence is given for this
interpretation of events and trends, nor is it apparent
that the expert knowledge made available to the
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Commission froin its own inernbership, from the
well-qualified team of economists on its Secretariat,
or from the list of 'Eminent Persons' Igiven on pages
297-81 who were specifically invited to give evidence
to it could have provided an adequate basis for such
a dramatic and unqualified form of words. It may be
that here the Commission is taking an unduly alarmist
view of an admittedly very uncertain future.
In the case of environmental problems. however, the
Commission is on firmer ground than in the case of
war, when it tries to demonstrate a connection between
these problems and the issue of economic development.
lt rightly draws attention to a long-term connection
which is almost certainly important; and it refers also
to a more immediate link which may likewise be
significant, though it appears to be less clearly established.
In the longer term, the connecting link is the prospective
rate of growth of world population: the Report argues
that
continued rapid population gmwth in the -,lext
centur,' could make the world unmanageable: but
that growth call on/i' be forestalled if action is taken
to combat porem' iii this centuri' I page 751.
The second and more immediate connection is said to
arise because
the biological e,zi'iron,nenl ... ¿ threatened with
destruction ill man, countries as a direct result of
I page 75j.
Although no specific instances of this are given, it
seems right to draw attention to the environmental
dangers which may arise from extreme poverty.
While, however, these connections exist, their signifi-
cance should not he overstated. lt is worth noting that
each of them is associated with only one aspect of the
Commission's concerns, namely absolute poverty, since
it is not suggested that there is a similar link between
environmental risks and international inequalities.
Moreover, and as the Commission shows itself well
aware, a threat to the biological environment may
arise from many sources other than poverty and
population growth. For both these reasons, but more
especially for the second, it is arguable that issues
relating to the environment ought for the most part to
he considered separately and in their own right, rather
than as an aspect of economic development or of the
relations between rich and poor countries. Here again
the Brandt Report has overstated the extent to which
world problems are tobe identified with the issues that
may arise between North and South.
Current Performance of the World Economy
The Brandt Commission takes an extremely gloomy
view of the present world economic scene. This
pessimism has two aspects. one chronic and the other
acute. The chronic aspect is that which is summarised
above as proposition b). namely a belief that the
existing system holds back the economic development
of the poor countries. This supposed effect has been
in operation ever since the establishment of the system.
at the end of World War II.
The acute aspect takes the form of a conviction that
because of more recent developments, over the past
ten years or so. the international economy is now in
grave trouble. Thus the Report states that
Iii ndamental changes are essential, whether in trade.
finance, energy or in other fields. if we arelo avoid a
serious breakdown of the world econornt' in the
decades of the eighties and the nineties. .
.
I page
31.
Here again, a possibly alarmist view is put forward
without qualification and with no hint that a different
assessment of future prospects could be made.'
The pessimism. however, is qualified and conditional.
The Commission believes that the risk of breakdown
or collapse would be averted if agreement were reached
between North and South on the necessary 'fundamental
changes. as embodied in the programme of action
which is set out in the Report. This view of the
situation is linked with propositions a) and c) above.
Thus once again the predicament of the world is
defined with reference to the relations between these
two groups of countries, while remedial measures are
seen as consisting of new collaborative agreements
between them. At the same time, both North and
South are perceived as having a strong mutual interest
in the proposed programme of action, for the simple
reason that each would benefit if the threat to stability
were removed. Moreover, this same set of reforms
would also deal with the chronic problem. by doing
away with the various constraints which the existing
system is thought to place on the developing countries.
It is convenient to look at this chronic aspect first.
Poor Countries and the International
Economic Order
The Commission accepts quite uncritically the idea
that the international economy in its present form has
contributed to frustrating the ambitions of the South
Similarly, the following diagnosis is later made: We face. . . not
merely one. but several crises: the crisis of relentless inflation and
increasing energy costs, the cris is of dwindling energy availability, the
crisis resulting from mounting financial requirements, and the crisis
posed by constraints on world trade and on the growth of export
earnings to meet increased debt service commitments. Taken together.
they threaten the whole structure of our political, industrial and
financial institutions, unless we move urgently and adequately to deal
with the basic causes page 2391.
For example, in World Development Report. 1979, World Bank.
Washington.
tordevelopment I page 127(. In the Report, the principal
statement of this view is to be found in the opening
chapter, and is worth quoting at some length. After
describing in summary terms the present extent of
inequality between North and South, the text continues
as follows:
Behind these differences lies the fundamental
inequality of economic strength. It is not just that
the North ¡SSO much richer than the South. Over 90
percent of the world's manufacturing industry is in
the North. Most patents and new technology are the
property of multinational corporations of the North,
which conduct a large share of world investment
and world trade in raw materials and manufactu res.
Because of this economic power northern countries
dominate the international economic system - its
rules and regulations, and its international institutions
of trade, money and finance. Some developing
countries have swum against this tide, taking the
opportunities which exist and overcoming many
obstacles; but most of them find the currents too
strong for them (page 32, emphasis added I.
The exact significance of this passage is far from clear.
The notion, however, that the poor countries have
been struggling with limited success against powerful
adverse force has definite implications, of a kind
which can be roughly checked against the evidence of
recent history.
If the notion were correct, one would expect to find
that the economic performance of the developing
countries over the past thirty years or so had two
outstanding features. First, the differences between
the various national economies would not be great.
since all of them would have been subject to the same
dominating external influence. Secondly. since this
influence was strongly unfavourable it would follow
that the general average level of performance would
remain low, both in absolute terms and in relation to
the richer countries.
As is well known, though not acknowledged in the
Report. actual post-World War Il developments have
presented a wholly different picture. Rates of growth
both in output and in output per head have varied very
considerably among the developing countries, while
the average levels for the period, around which this
wide dispersion can be observed, have been quite
remarkably high. In terms of total output, the rate of
growth for the developing countries actually exceeded
that for the OECD countries as a group, even though
this latter average was itself much higher than had
been attained in any previous period of history. In
terms of output per head the comparison is of course
less favourable to the South. On average, its rate of
growth in this respect was probably rather less than
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that of the North; and since in general the poorer
developing countries grew more slowly than the rest
of the group, the gap between the richest and the
poorest countries of the world continued to widen.
But this average rate of growth in output per head for
the South as a whole was far higher than had ever been
achieved in the past. possibly over three times as high.5
Moreover, in the period since 1973, in which most of
the OECD group have found it much harder than
before to maintain satisfactoiy levels and rates of
growth of econoniic activity, the rapid expansion of
the South has up to now been far better sustained.
These striking and wholly unforeseen developments
are not brought out in the Brandt Report. In the first
chapter we are told that:
in the two and a half decades following the Second
World War the world economy v'as transformed...
the industrialised world expeiienced economic growth
andan vpansion in trade without parallel in history.
which contributed to growth in some pails of the
Third World I page 381.
One might describe this as a somewhat stylised version
of history. In two later passages pages 171 and 2031
partial and incidental reference is made to economic
growth in the South,but not in a way which brings out
the salient factsindeed, in the second of these
references it is implied, quite misleadingly, that the
rate of growth of output in the post-World War H
period was higher in the North than in the South.
In this respect, therefore, the Commission's description
of the working of the international system does not
accord with the facts. More generally, it can be said
that the Report over-estimates the importance of
external as opposed to internal factors in relation to
t he economic development of countries and groups of
countries, even though it concedes Ipage 1271 that
changes in the international system alone tt'ill not
suffice. Moreover, the way in which external influences
operate is perceived in surprisingly simple-minded
terms. The Commission seems to believe that countries
become rich in large part through the exercise of
'economic power', and stay poor because they have
failed to acquire this not very clearly defined attribute.
Hence, it argues that an essential item of reform is
change in the uses of eco,,omic power in the world
I pages 64-51. so as to rnodifi' the nunzerou.s wars in
which economic and ei'e,i militari strength conf',:c on
countries, organisations and corporations in the North
the ability to manage the world economy to a
considerable degree in its own favour page 651. The
As was observed in a book published in 1977: almost certainly. the
past 25 years in the ldcs I developing countries I have seen more growth
in output per person than the previoús 20 centuries. Michael Lipton.
Why Poor People Stay Poor. London. Temple Smith. 1977. p 29.
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nature and modus operandi of this power, and the
possible value of the benefits which it confers, are left
obscure.
The extent to which prosperity in the modern world
derives from power, though debatable ánd difficult to
estimate, is probably very restricted. Suppose that we
consider first the growth of output per head, as distinct
from the absolute level attained. Over the past thirty
years, as has been seen, most countries have participated
in a process of extremely rapid growth, and for almost
all of them the growth in their output has been the
main influence on the way in which levels of real
income have changed. To try to explain the growth of
output and output per head with reference to the
exercise of economic power would bean unrewarding
if not ridiculous task. Is it for instance in such terms
that one could hope to account for the respective
post-Workl War II economic performances of Britain
and Japan? Within the developing world, does economic
power in any way help to explain the amazingly high
sustained rates of expansion in southern Europe, or in
Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan? In
these and other cases it is obvious that a quite different
explanatory system is required. Nor is the position
different if we consider the level of real income, rather
than its current rate of increase, since most rich
countries are rich because of past increases in production
per head over a long period. Furthermore, the most
prosperous states within the North are not necessarily
the most powerful: is it through the exercise of 'economic
strength' that Sweden and Switzerland have become
possibly the two richest industrial countries?
To make sense of the idea that economic power may
partly determine prosperity, it is necessary to turn
from quantities to prices. Presumably the main potential
use of such power in the modern world is to enable a
stateor some of its citizensto affect the prices of
goods which enter into international trade, thus
improving its terms of trade at the expense of others.
and altering the distribution of world consumption.
But, apart from the importanthut also highly
untypicalcase of petroleum. it is not clear that
action of this kind has had any significant and lasting
effects on the levels of real income attained by any
state or group of states in recent decades. The Brandt
Commission simply assumes, as others have done, that
the North must have made substantial gains of this
kind, because of its alleged ability to manage the
world economy in its fi'our, and because the it'at'
markets operate. . . ispresenth' to its advantage I page
761. This extremely questionable view of events and
relationships, which many economists would regard
as grossly misleading. is put forward as though it were
an obvious and accepted truth.
The Commission's whole approach to the process of
economic change. and to the ways in which this
process may be affected by the nature of the international
economic system. is in fact naively political. In this
picture of the world, what chiefly influences the material
well-being of countries is not what they produce, nor
how their productive potential may change over time,
but their supposed bargaining power in relation to
other countries. Rich countries are strong; strong
countries are in a good bargaining position; therefore
the economic prospects of the poor countries are
always and necessarily cloudedat any rate unless
deliberate international action is taken to redress the
balance of economic power. This primitive vision of
history and of economic relations is so firmly entrenched
in the thinking of the Commission that, as was noted
above, the well-established evidence of the economic
progress made by many poor countries is set aside: in
George Orwell's useful term, it has become an 'unfact':
All this makes depressing reading, the more so since it
comes from such a distinguished. widely representative
and influential group of people.
Mutual Interests of North and South
A whole chapter ot the Report is devoted to the
subject of mutual interests, since the Commission
believes that these have been insufficiently recognised.
The theme is a promising one and a number of good
points are made in the chapter. Nevertheless, the two
main distinctive elements in the Report's discussion
of mutual interests are both in my view open to
question. One of these, which concerns the benefits
to all from an agreed international energy strategy,
will be considered e1ow. The second, which has
attracted a good deal of public comment, is presented
as a means to restoring the health of the world
economy.
The general idea is summarised as follows in the first
chapter of the Report:
tve believe that a large-scale transferof resources to
the South can make a major impact on growth in
both the South and the North and help to revive the
tiagging world economy I page 361.
This has been widely interpreted by readers of the
Report to mean that larger aid flows would provide a
beneficial stimulus to demand in the rich countries,
because they would give rise to an increase in exports
to the recipients. Such an interpretation is consistent
with the sentence just quoted, and also with some
passages in the latter part of the Report. as for example
where reference is made to the coexistence of the
great needs in the South and the under-used capacity
in the No,ih I page 2381. In this form, the idea is similar
to that developed by Roy Jenkins. the President of the
Commission of the European Community, in his lecture
to the Overseas Development Institute in 1979. In this
he referred to the continuing reality of Kernesianism
on a world scale. even if it has lost some of its national
relevance, and to the possibility that the developed
world is unable to start growing again until demand is
increased in the developing world.'
This argument, however, is open to an obvious and
damaging objection, which perhaps surprisinglybut
also creditablyis both stated and endorsed in a
different section of the Brandt Report itself. The
Report refers in Chapter 3 Ipages 67-81 to the case
which has been developed for 'pump-priming the
world economy' through aid transfers, and then
continues:
critics have questioned the validity of this argument.
Why should northern governments, hesitant to
stimulate their own economies in a period of
stagnation, find more virtue in a process of stimulation
which operates via the developing countries?
lemphasis added j.
To this extremely pertinent question the Report goes
on to provide two answers. First, larger aid flows
would contribute to world stability by helping the
process of recycling oil surpluses. Secondly, the higher
exports to the South would be accompanied by higher
imports from it, so that there would be no serious
inflationary effects: the North would gain, not from an
increase in exports associated with a larger trade
surplus, but from 'balanced trade expansion'.
This second argument. however, is not consistent with
the notion of 'international Keynesianism'. except in a
highly qualified form. Precisely because a 'balanced
trade expansion' would have only a limited effect on
the level of demand in the rich countries, its effects on
output and employment would likewise be restricted.
The agreeable vision of matching Southern needs and
Northern excess capacity is no longer tenable, since
with a balanced expansion the reduction in excess
capacity in the export industries of the North would be
largely offset by an increase in excess capacity in the
industries producing the goods displaced by the higher
imports from the South.
Thus the Commission appears to speak with two
voices on this issue. On the one hand, it suggests in
certain passages of the Report that larger flows of aid
to poor countries could be the means to securing
economic expansion in the rich countries, through the
agency of higher exports. At the same time,it offers an
alternative analysis of the effects of an increase in aid,
which though less open to objection is also more
modest in its claims. Not surprisingly, it is the first of
Roy Jenkins. 'Europe and the Developing World. ODI Revsew,
London, no I. 1979. p6.
77
these argumentsthe idea of matching the South's
need for more goods to the North's need for more
jobswhich has captured public attention since the
publication of the Report. 1-lere again, the impression
is created that a problem which does not directly
involve the economic relations between rich and poor
countriesin this case, the largely internal problem of
'stagflation' in the Northcan best be handled in the
context of these relations. But the impression is
misleading, for reasons which are actually to be found
within the Brandt Report itself.
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
Underlying the various specific proposals made by the
Brandt Commission is a set of related beliefs about the
working of the political and economic system. These
are implied rather than stated in the Report itself: they
are too much taken for granted to be made t he subject
of explicit reference. In my view, however, they are
more open to question than the Commission supposes.
lt is convenient to consider them under four headings.
These are: the faith in regulation: the mistrust of
markets, together with the failure to recognise their
potential scope and uses: the neglect of uncertainty;
and the belief in the existence of known 'solutions'.
The arguments under each heading are not fully
separate. but interconnected and mutually
reinforcing.
Faith in Regulation
Inevitably, the recommendations in the Commission's
programme of action are addressed to governments.
and to the international agencies which they control.
Often these recommendations would require agreement
and collaboration between states and their governments,
and this international aspect of reform is a consistent
theme of the Report:
more and more local problems can on/i' be solved
sic J through internatio,ialsolu lions... I page 33J.
For a number of reasons, some of which have been
touched on above, it might be argued that the
Commission has over-emphasised the need for action
at the global rather than the national level. Domestic
policies, however, are by no means neglected, and
Chapter 8 of the Report in particular is largely concerned
with the various measures which the Commission
believes should he adopted within the developing
countries. The different levels of action are seen as
related parts of a consistent set of reforms.
Within the recommendations, one of the themes which
can be detected is a belief in the desirability and
efficacy of administrative regulations to be drawn up
by governments, acting either jointly or severally, and
to be enforced either by them or by the international
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agencies which they control. Such administrative
mechanisms are often designed as a substitute for
market processes, and to adopt or recommend them
implies two distinct forms of judgement. In the first
place, it entails the view that market processes in
themselves will produce results which are unsatisfactory,
so that some form of guidance, control or supplementary
action is needed. Secondly, administrative devices are
judged to be a superior means of control to measures
which are designed to influence or establish prices,
and thus to improve the working of market forces
rather than to supersede them.
Both these strands of thought are evident in the work
of the Brandt Commission, though neither is developed
in a systematic way. As to the effects of market
processes, it has been noted already that the Report
accepts uncritically the dubious idea that markets at
present work to the advantage of the rich countries,
and are therefore a source of inequality and injustice.
This idea is given i-flore general expression in the
opening chapter of the Report,where it is laid down,
though without argument or evidence, that
economic forces left entire/v to themselves tend to
produce growing inequality Ipage 321. Soon after this
assertion, the principle is stated that
- fundamental structural changes must be made
in the markets in which developing countries ai-e
suppliers - of commodities, of manufactures, of
labourand in which they ai-e customers tbr
capital and technology ¡page 321.
As to the ways in which market processes may need to
be unproved or supplanted altogether, a principal
theme of the Report is the necesity for collaborative
action by 'the world community' to shape a new
international order. This order is seen as - . . a
continuous/v changing process in which forethought
and negotiation operate constant/i' to establish an
overall balance between its elements, whether individual
or collective Ipage 2681. Such a conception of the
future strongly implies a belief that the sphere of high-
level administrative action ought to be extended.
Admittedly, it cannot be said of the Report that it
neglects the possibility of making markets work more
effectively. Thus in Chapter 8 it is suggested that in
developing countries sound economic management
mai'. - - call for the reform of the price system to better
reflect the i-eat costs of resources ¡page 1331though
the point is made incidentally and in passing, and is
not treated, as it could well have been, as a major
theme of the chapter or even of the whole Report.
Again, some of the recommendations on trade, such
as those relating to safeguard measures against imports,
would make for freer markets and less discrimination.
The proposed measures to stabilise commodity prices
and export earnings could likewise be thought of, in
part at least, as an attempt to improve the working and
the results of cominodity markets, which would still
continue in operation. At the saine time, there are
certain areas of policy in which administrative mechan-
isms are specifically recommended, and where the use
of prices is either implicitly or explicitly rejected,
because of what seems to be an optimistic view of the
practicability and effects on regulation.
The two main instances of this are industry and
energy. In industry, much is made of the need for
more effective regulation of transnational corporations;
developing countries are urged to pursue more selective
policies in admitting foreign investments [page 191!;
and a future is anticipated where these countries
should bein a better position, where appropriate,
to unpackage the technology-investment package
separating out the components of investment,
technology, management and marketing, and
importing only what they need[sic[... [page 191!.
All this shows a robust faith in the capacity of official
committees to make complex choices with a large
discretionary element and takes no account of the
possibility that more decentralised criteria and methods
might be used. Again, neither the recommendation
[page 1861 that fair labour standards should be
internationally agreed in order to prevent unfair
competition and to facilitate trade liberalisation
emphasis added! j, nor again the implicit endorsement
page 2301 of the Lima target for industrialisation in
the developing world, are consistent with the
Commission's aireadyquoted acceptance of the principle
that prices should reflect the cost of real resources
used.
It is in energy, however, that the Report is most in
favour of regulatory systems embodied in international
agreements. It advocates nothing less than a global
strategy for energy [page 1601, involving exceptional
measures of international collaboration [page 1611.
This international strategy would form part of the
Commission's suggested 'Emergency Programme' for
the first half of the 1980s. It would take the form of a
'global agreement', in which oil exporting countries
would guarantee supplies, major oil consumers would
commit themselves to agreed targets for energy use,
oil prices would become more stable and predictable,
the security and real returns of oil producers' investments
would be guaranteed, and a major concerted investment
programme would be undertaken in exploration for
oil and natural gas in developing countries and in the
development of renewable energy sources.
All this seems highly optimistic, not to say unreal. It is
not clear how price levels could be determined, nor
how targets and 'guarantees' could be adequately
defined. More important, it is still less apparent how
any country, whether exporter or importer, borrower
or investor, could be held to an agreement when
either internal or external circumstances alteredas
for example when a change of government took place.
Moreover, the proposal takes no account of the danger
that when governments go out of their way to become
involved in international energy transactions, the
likelihood of friction between them may be increased:
a good recent example is the decision by the United
States Department of Energy in 1978 to disallow an
agreement by an American utility to buy Mexican
natural gas, on the grounds that the price was too high.
Mistrust and Non-recognition of Market Modes
In part, the Commission's belief in the virtues of
regulation arises from an active mistrust or scepticism
about the likely effects of allowing markets to work.
This is particularly evident in the case of energy,
where it is argued that the market incentives and
supph' patterns for current oil production do not
create an orderly framework for equilibrating supply
and demand [page 1651. At the same time, it is clear
that at various points in the Report the idea of using
markets is not so much consciously rejected, as in the
instance just quoted, but rather is simply not perceived
as a genuine possibility.
This can be seen most clearly in the frequent references
that are made to 'needs' or 'requirements' on the part
of countries. This implies the view that up to a certain
point what is used or consumed can be regarded as
'essentiaF another revealing term - while beyond that
point there is a marked change in the value of
consumption, as the domain of the 'non-essential' is
entered. This way of thinking is quite alien to the
conception of economic choice which underlies the
case for using market modes of allocation, and which
is stated in terms of possible substitution at the margin.
In this latter view of choice, there are no needs to be
met regardless of cost, and to think in terms of a sharp
transition from essential to non-essential is meaningless.
How economic agents rate alternative situations can
be judged only from the way they react to changes in
incomes and prices: there is no way in which 'needs'
can be independently determined, and to state issues
in this form is to reduce unnecessarily, and probably
with damaging effects, the range of choices that is in
principle open.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the
concept of 'needs' makes its most frequent appearance
in the Brandt Report in the chapter on energy. Here
the passage which departs furthest from an economist's
conception of how choices should be looked atan
entirely unwitting departure, in all probabilityis
79
actually quoted from the Energy Commission of the
former Commission on International Economic
Cooperation. This body
ecommended that, in periods of reduced oil
supplies, the most vulnerable developing countries
should be given priority to allow them to meet
essential requirements . . . page 170, emphasis
added.
Various similar references, however, can be found in
relation to topics other than energy. Thus on page 228
the Commission refers (quoting in this case a United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
IUNCTADI document) to the aggregate needs of all
the least developed cou nt ries for external capital, and
on page 175 to the trading needs of the developing
countries.
In all these cases the implication is the same: that
there is a sharp change in the slope of the relevant
schedule which relates quantities used to utility derived,
a change which occurs at the point where a transition
from 'essential' to 'non-essential' is made; and that this
point can be accurately determined by observation. In
so far as situations are perceived and problems are
formulated in this way, there is no scope for thinking
in terms of market modes, and the regulatoiy approach,
without necessarily being consciously approved as
such, moves into the resulting vacuum.
Neglect of Uncertainty
As with many other observers of the world scene, the
Commission's partiality for national and international
regulatory action is partly the outcome of a high
degree of confidence that the future either is or can be
made reasonably predictable and hence controllable.
Here again the chapter on energy provides an illustration.
Alt hough. as just noted, the Commission believes that
'market incentives and supply patterns' in oil 'do not
create an orderly framework for equilibrating supply
and demand', it is tacitly assumed that a global strategy
for energy could do so. Such a strategy s further
recommended because order/v and predictable price
changes are important to focilit ate a smooth development
of the world economy page 1711. Again it is taken for
granted that the strategy can ensure this orderliness
and predictability.
A similar optimism can he found in other sections of
the Report. Thus it is argued in relation to mineral
development that once exploration has been completed
and the extent of a deposit is known, it will become
much simpler for host cou ntrv governments to reach
equitable and stable contracts with foreign companies
I page 157 J as though the extent of a deposit were
actually known at this stage, and as though the
prospective earning power even ol a known deposit
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could not he radically altered as a result of unforeseen
price movements. Again, it is argued that in recent
years exchange rates, under the influence of speculative
capital flows, have been driven for beyond levels
which can be related to real economic ad/u siment
needs page 2071as though these 'needs' could be
accurately assessed before the event.
A similar confidence is revealed in the way that the
Commission puts forward its proposals for improving
the working of particular markets within the international
system. In three important areas namely primary
commodities, energy, and exchange rates it is suggested
that official action should be taken to stabilise prices
around their trend values. For commodities, the idea
is that prices should be stabilised 'at remunerative
levels' through international agreements. In energy,
the goal is that prices should reflect long-tenn scarcities',
while changes should be 'orderly and predictable'. For
exchange rates, increased stability should be sought
through domestic discipline and coordination of
appropriate national policies Ipage 2191.
Now all these are familiar and widely'supported
proposals, and to make them is not in itself a sign of
excessive faith that the future can be foreseen. It
implies no more than a belief that the official agencies
concerned can make a better job of prediction than
others could. It is, however, important to recognise
that this belief is very much open to question: it ought
not to be assumed unreflectingly that official intervention
to inoderate short-term fluctuations, and to keep
prices in line with long-run trends, will necessarily be
successful; and much of past experience in these
matters is far from reassuring. If in fact official agencies
cannot foresee the course of events any better that
other market operators, then intervention may actually
increase the extent of instability, and the world might
be better off if the attempt to manage commodity
prices, energy prices and exchange rates were
abandoned. Despite a welcome reference Ipage 1481
to the diffïculties of securing effective stabilization
aI'rangements in commodities, the Brandt Report takes
too little account of this possibility. Its treatment of
these issues gives the impression, which here again is a
misleading one, that if governments are sufficiently
detennined to stabilise these prices they will necessarily
succeed in doing so.
Belief In Known 'Solutions'
The Commission's tendency to underrate the extent
of uncertainty is in my view a particular aspect of a
wider and rather disturbing attitude. This consists of a
belief that the extremely complex problems of the
international system are for the most part well
understood. In the Report, the clearest symptoms of
this attitude are to be found in the frequent references
that are mnade to problems being 'solved', or having
'solutions'. The most revealing single passage of this
kind occurs near the beginning of the final chapter.
After sumnmarising once again the present human
predicament as the Commission perceives it, the Report
continues:
What limits our response to this challenge, on which
the destiny of mankind depends? Not primarily the
technical solutions, which are largely already familiar,
but the non-existence of a clear and generalised
awareness of the realities and dangers and the
absence of political will to face up to them and take
corrective action page 267-8, emphasis added I.
This diagnosis seems to me quite extraordinarily naive,
for two distinct reasons. First, it is evident that the
process of economic and social change, as also the
working of the international system, are not at all well
understood: they remain highly obscure and uncertain
and hence a constant source of both controversy and
surprise. Partly for this reason, the idea that there
exists a body of known and agreed measures which
would constitute 'corrective action' is illusory. Secondly,
it is a profound mistake to suppose that the issues of
social and economic life are such that it makes sense
to think in terms of 'solutions' to them, as though they
were like the entries in a crossword puzzle, for which
there can be found a recognised, uniquely correct,
and permanently valid set of responses. It is easy to
understand how this form of words can find its way
into a document such as the Brandt Report, which is
designed to convey an urgent message, and which is
rightly concerned to make its points as simply and
clearly as possible. Nonetheless, the reference to
'solutions' is depressing evidence that the problem has
been approached in a frame of mind which is
inappropriate to it.
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